

























Dynamics of Output Growth, Consumption and Physical Capital 



















Department of Economics and Related Studies 
University of York 
Heslington 




Job Tenure in Britain: 














Karen Mumford and Peter N. Smith 
 
  Department of Economics 











Abstract                   J E L   #   J 2  
We consider differences in current job tenure of individuals using linked employee and 
workplace data. This enables us to distinguish between variation in tenure  associated with the 
characteristics of individual employees and those of  the workplace in which they work. The 
various individual characteristics are, as a group, found to be essentially uncorrelated with the 
workplace effect, however, this is not true for women and non-white employees. We find that the 
lower tenure associated with membership of these demographic groups is predominantly captured 
by workplace effects suggesting some degree of labour market segmentation in Britain. 
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1.  Introduction   
Job stability has increasingly become an issue of public and professional interest over the last two 
decades. A recent focus of this interest has been on the possible changes in the distribution of  
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worker￿s current job tenure. In particular, authors have examined the question of whether jobs are 
less long lasting than they used to be
1. Whilst the results from these papers are far from uniform, 
they do suggest that in the US there has been some decrease in tenure (albeit modest) amongst 
those white males who had previously had relatively long tenure, amongst blacks and amongst 
young adults (Neumark et al., 1999). Similarly, the UK has seen some fall in average male tenure 
(Gregg and Wadsworth, 1995 and 1998), especially so amongst the lower paid (Burgess and 
Rees, 1996), although again these changes are not dramatic (Burgess and Rees, 1998; Nickell et 
al., 2002). 
 
Much of the early literature on job tenure concentrated on the extent to which workers 
would move between jobs until they found a satisfactory match (Stigler, 1962; Jovanovic, 1979). 
Freeman (1980) and Freeman and Medoff (1984) further argued that the presence of trade unions 
increase individual job tenure by providing a ￿voice￿ for grievances as well as increasing wages, 
both resulting in lower quit rates. More recent models argue that tenure is explicitly the outcome 
of the interaction of dynamic flows across both jobs and workers in the economy (Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1990; Burgess et al., 1999 and 2001). 
 
The empirical analysis of job tenure has been restricted by the nature of the available data 
sets which have typically provided little demographic and job-related information in addition to 
measures of individual tenure. In particular, none of the existing studies employ substantive 
linked workplace information. In this paper we compare and explore the determinants of the 
distribution of job tenure amongst employees in Britain. In so doing, we will consider differences 
in the nature of the workplaces as well as in the characteristics of the employees. This study is 
possible due to the recently produced linked surveys of  workplaces and their employees in the 
British  Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 ( WERS98)
2. 
 
A more complete explanation of the distribution of individual and workplace tenure 
                          
1Tenure is one of a number of measures of job stability. We could alternatively identify quit rates or total separations 
(Mumford and Smith, 2003). An advantage of tenure as a measure of stability is that it captures longer run, more 
permanent behaviour. A drawback, as Freeman (1980) notes, is that the job-related information we have from survey 
data relates primarily to current job conditions rather than to earlier periods of the relationship between worker and 
firm. This may especially affect the interpretation of the influence of attitudinal questions. 
2Department of Trade and Industry  (1999). Workplace Employee Relations Survey: Cross-Section, 1998 (computer 
file). 4
th ed. Colchester: The Data Archive (distributor), 22 December 1999. SN: 3955.   
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contains both labour supply and demand elements. Thus, the inclusion of workplace effects in 
addition to the labour supply determinants that feature in the work following Freeman (1980) 
may play an important role. We will explicitly consider the role of changes in workplace labour 
demand  on job tenure by incorporating features of the Cabellero and Hammour (1994) model of 
job reallocation into our analysis at the workplace level. There is an obvious link between higher 
job reallocation rates and lower average tenure in a workplace since factors which increase 
(decrease) new hires will decrease (increase) average tenure ceteris paribus 
3.  
 
In this study, we propose to concentrate on the determination of individual worker tenure 
given knowledge of the average tenure and characteristics of the workplace where they are 
employed. In particular, we are interested in discovering if low tenure individuals are 
concentrated in workplaces which have low average tenure (and vice versa). We also want to 
know whether there are identifiable characteristics of individual employees which makes them 
more likely to have shorter tenure than their workplace average (and vice versa). We find that 
individual and workplace effects explain, on the margin, about equal amounts of the variation of 
individual tenure. This result emphasises the importance of allowing for workplace effects. 
Furthermore, the two sets of variables are essentially uncorrelated with one another. 
 
                          
3Mumford and Smith (2002) explore this relationship more fully by considering net employment change and average 
tenure as alternative dependent variables for Australia. They find that, with the exclusion of training,  variables which 
were found to have a significant effect on job reallocation  had a significant and opposite effect on average tenure. 
An important related issue is that of labour market segmentation. For example, it is 
possible that the labour market is in some ways divided into workplaces which offer better 
working conditions, are more attractive places of employment and are associated with longer 
tenure, and those that are not (Doeringer and Piore, 1971, and Taubman and Wachter, 1986). It 
has previously been shown that females and non-white employees have shorter tenure (Burgess 
1998; Neumark et al., 1999). Here we show that in our data this result is predominantly due to the  
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nature of the workplace they are employed in. Indeed, the shorter individual tenure (conditional 
on their individual characteristics) of females disappears once workplace effects are allowed for 
whilst that of non-whites is substantially reduced. 
 
In section 2 of the paper we examine the econometric procedures used with linked data.  
We go on to discuss the determination of individual and workplace tenure job tenure in sections 3 
and 4. Section 5 evaluates the estimation results. We conclude in section 6. 
 
2.  Estimation. 
The presence of linked employee and employer workplace information allows us to estimate 
models of tenure differentials across workplaces, conditional on characteristics of individual 
workers. The linked nature of the data sets to be employed can thus be used to good effect. 
Typically individual-based data sets, whilst they may include some workplace information, do 
not identify where more than one individual in the data is employed in any given workplace. 
Individual-based data sets also, typically, have limited workplace information.
4  The model to be 
estimated is: 
µ β α ik ik k ik + X + = Τ           ( 1 )  
where the tenure of worker i in workplace k (Tik) is explained by a set of individual characteristics 
(Xik) and a workplace fixed effect (αk), ￿ik is an iid error term
5. As Bronars and Famulari (1997), 
Bingley and Westergaad-Nielsen (1998), and Abowd et al (1999) show, this equation can be 
estimated with the within estimator employed usually in panel data problems (see Greene, 1997). 
Workplace effects and individual characteristics  are not assumed to be uncorrelated and it is 
possible to recover the proportional contributions of the two types of effect. We expect both types 
of effect to be important.
 6 
                          
4 Two recent studies of linked datasets on wages, tenure and employment dynamics (Bronars and Famulari, 1997, 
and Bingley and Westergaad-Nielsen, 1998) also have very limited workplace information. 
5The form of tenure model we use here is linear in the individual characteristics and workplace fixed effects. In 
common with Freeman (1980) and subsequent authors, we adopt this first-order Taylor approximation to a more 
complicated hazard function. Freeman (1980) provides evidence in favour of this approach relative to a constant 
hazard model. 
6More generally, there may also be unobservable individual effects in equation (1). Those common to all employees 
in a workplace are captured in the workplace effect, αk. The remaining idiosyncratic unobservable individual  effects 
are denoting  as γi which modifies the equation to: 
µ γ β α ik i ik k ik + + X + = Τ  
It is not possible to identify these γi effects in our data and we relegate them to the residual. This will have no 




If one is prepared to go a step further and assume that the determinants of the workplace 
fixed effects and the individual characteristics are uncorrelated, it is possible to estimate the  
determination of the workplace fixed effects. The model is therefore: 
ε γ α k k k + Z + a = ￿           ( 2 )  
where theα ￿k  are generated from equation (1), Zk are workplace characteristics and εk is an iid 
error term. 
 
It is not possible with the single cross-section of linked worker and workplace 
information in WERS98 to allow for completely general, unconstrained estimation employing 
individual and workplace characteristics. Abowd et al (1999) show that under some quite 
restrictive assumptions, more progress can be made if the dataset has a panel format (ie., at least 
two cross-sections over time).
7 
 
In evaluating the estimation results we will measure the relative explanatory contribution 
of the sets of individual characteristics and workplace effects. We can also compare estimates 
which omit the workplace fixed effects (entitled OLS in the tables) and the full estimates (entitled 
fixed effects or FE). An issue that we can address by this comparison is that of segmentation. 
 
Among our demographic and occupational groupings we have groups who, in variety of 
different papers, have been identified as more likely to be in a different labour market segmented 
from the remainder (such as females and non-whites, see  Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Taubman 
and Wachter, 1986; Joshi and Paci, 1998). A test of this idea can be carried out by comparison of 
the coefficients between the OLS and the fixed effects results. If a demographic identifier is  
significant in the OLS estimates but not in the fixed effect estimates, then we can attribute the 
impact of membership of that demographic group to the workplace rather that to the worker￿s 
                                                                           
biases in our estimates from this source to be small; a point we elaborate on further in discussing the results below.  




individual characteristic. This would be evidence suggesting segmentation. 
 
3.  Modelling job tenure. 
The distribution of job tenure across current employees is clearly the outcome of the interaction 
of both supply and demand effects. At the individual level, the decision to seek and continue 
market employment has been well documented in the labour supply literature (Killingsworth, 
1983; Jovanovic, 1979). Models of the firm￿s demand for labour via the process of job creation 
and job destruction are rarer (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1990; Caballero and Hammour, 1994 and 
1996; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) but also well documented. Attempts to combine these job 
and worker flows concepts into an aggregate matching model across firms and employees are still 
at the empirical stage, however, and have not yet resulted in formalised theoretical models 
(Burgess et al., 1999 and 2001; Anderson and Meyer, 1994).  Whilst tenure is the outcome of 
these flow processes, models of labour turnover will probably be observationally equivalent for 
data on job durations (Topel and Ward, 1992). We therefore follow the recent literature on tenure 
and adopt a holistic modelling approach.  
 
Freeman (1980), in his discussion of the union-exit voice issue, provides a useful set of 
organising principles for the analysis of individual worker tenure. These are the pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary benefits of the current job and, in addition, the personal characteristics affecting 
the transactions costs of job mobility. 
 
The pecuniary benefits of the current job are clearly dominated by the wage. However, 
this is obviously endogenous in the determination of tenure and it would not be  valid to include 
it amongst the explanatory variables in regression analysis (Brown, 1989). Freeman and numbers 
of other authors have subsequently attempted to adjust for the simultaneity of the wage in tenure 
regressions (Freeman and Medoff, 1984 and Miller and Mulvey, 1991). The workplace fixed 
effects that we allow for could influence both wages and tenure, so we simplify the analysis by 




Non-pecuniary work benefits are hard to identify but we extend the range of variables 
used in the exit voice tenure studies by including variables that identify demographic 
information, job characteristics and job environment, education, and occupation. We expect that 
demographic information which includes family circumstances will be highly correlated with the 
transactions costs of job mobility. Whilst measures of education and occupation may be 
correlated with the value of outside opportunities. Each of the groups of variables is described in 
more detail below. 
 
The most important difference between our estimates and the existing literature is the 
addition of workplace fixed effects. In terms of the classification above, we can anticipate that 
these workplace effects predominantly influence the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits of the 
current job and will be much less correlated with outside opportunities. To the extent that we find 
these fixed effects to be of statistical significance, this strengthens our belief in the relative 
importance of current-job-related information. In particular, this also raises the possible 
importance of the labour demand or firm initiated determinants of tenure. As discussed by 
Mumford and Smith (1996 and 2002), dynamic models of labour demand (such as that outlined 
by Cabellero and Hammour, 1994) can provide predictions of the likely impact of shocks to the 
demand for the firm￿s output. For example, if subject to a negative demand shock, the firm may 
choose to reduce tenure by increasing the rate of layoff whilst leaving the hiring rate unchanged. 
The costs of hiring and firing will play an important role here. In the current study, labour 




4. Data and variable choice. 
The data used in this study are drawn from the British Workplace Employee Relations Survey 
1998 (WERS98)
8 which is the largest,  currently available, survey of its type and was conducted 
                          
8Department of Trade and Industry  (1999). Workplace Employee Relations Survey: Cross-Section, 1998 (computer 
file). 4
th ed. Colchester: The Data Archive (distributor), 22 December 1999. SN: 3955.   
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between October 1997 and June 1998 (Cully et al., 1998). Interviews were conducted with a 
manager (with day-to-day responsibility for employee relations) and with a worker 
representative
9 (if nominated) at 2191 workplaces (all of which had more than 10 employees
10). 
Employees in these workplaces were also randomly sampled (a sample size of 28,215). All of 
these surveys are  linkable. The WERS98 was released in February, 1999, so there has been little 
time for studies of tenure to be undertaken using these data. There have been a limited number of 
studies using earlier versions of the WERS data sets (Millward et al., 1999). However, the 
linkable employee surveys add a major, and very valuable, component to existing studies of 
tenure: providing for the possibility of separating out individual from workplace effects on 
tenure. 
 
We essentially have data from surveys at two different levels: the individual employee, 
and the workplace. We will address these in turn. 
 
4.1.  At the individual level. 
The individual employee survey asked respondents for demographic information about 
themselves (such as age, education, number of children), factual information about their jobs 
(hours worked, employer provided training, et cetera) and to a lesser degree attitudinal questions 
                          
9￿The senior lay representative of the recognised union with the most members at the workplace or if there were no 
recognised unions, but a joint consultative committee operated, the senior employee representative on that 
committee￿ (Cully, 1998;9). 
10We do not believe that this will bias our results. Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996; 66-70) show that the 
regression fallacy can make small firms/workplaces seem very different from the rest when in fact they are not, 
especially in respect of net employment growth (with obvious implications for tenure). In addition measurement error 
is proportionally more important among the smallest workplaces and sampling errors larger (Davis, Haltiwanger and 
Schuh, 1996; 211).  
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about their job and their job environment. The overlap between these categories, especially 
between job characteristics and job environment, is major and is accentuated by the attitudinal 
nature of many of the survey questions (such as the extent of job effort and/or insecurity). We 
have accordingly, somewhat arbitrarily, blocked the summary statistics for variables for 
employees in Table 1 into demographic attributes; and job characteristics (with education and 
occupation controls listed separately). 
 
Considering Table 1 in more detail, column one presents the name of the variable, 
columns two to five present summary statistics and column six provides the variable definition. 
The data have been weighted to allow for stratification and clustering (Deaton,1998) and thus 
represent the sampling population.  
 
It becomes immediately obvious that whilst WERS98 may be a useful data set, it is not 
perfect. For example, with respect to tenure respondents were asked  to choose a band (5 
available bands) with a maximum value of 10 years or more. If this latter band is coded at 10 
years, the average tenure in Britain (tenure) is 5.36 years. 
 
The best estimate of the average length of completed job spells, given only data on 
uncompleted jobs, is that (given certain assumptions) they  last precisely twice the elapsed tenure 
period (Burgess and Rees, 1996)
11. So  we would expect an individual to spend on average 10.7 
years in a  job
12. In this paper, however, we will be examining the distribution of tenure amongst 
those people employed. We will not be exploring the distribution of tenure over jobs
13. 
                          
11An alternative could be to estimate retention rates, however, this would involve making the rather strong 
assumptions that the employment function is stable and that the arrival rate is constant over time (Neumark et al., 
1999). 
12Most available data on tenure is truncated, probably due to survey constraints and fears of recall error by 
respondents (Burgess and Rees, 1998). Gregg and Wadsworth (1998) use data from the General Household Survey 
for the UK to consider changes in job security over time. The GHS has limited job and workplace information but it 
does ask for tenure with the current employer. This information is banded up to a maximum of 40 years. Gregg and 
Wadsworth (1998) found, with no correction for possible recall bias, that the average job tenure was >just over five 
years￿ in the UK, and the expected average job tenure was some eleven years. 
13Discussion of length-biased sampling difficulties that might be involved  in this latter task are provided in Chesher 




The demographic variables reveal an average age across workers of 39 years, 48% of the 
workforce is female, 3.5% non-white, and 70% married (cohabiting with spouse or partner). The 
distibution of children is fairly even across the three age bands. We would expect from the 
literature on discrimination (Cain, 1986; Joshi and Paci, 1998) and segmented labour markets 
(Doeringer and Piore, 1971) that, if these variables did have an impact on tenure then being 
young, female (especially with children), and  non-white would all lead to shorter tenure. 
 
Amongst the job characteristics, we include a range of variables which reflect the non-
pecuniary quality of the job: home working, job sharing and flexible working time available. We 
believe that jobs with flexible working patterns would be more attractive to employees and be 
associated with longer tenure. We also include variables measuring whether the individual is 
employed part time, their total hours worked and if they would  would prefer to work more hours. 
Labour supply theory suggests that working generates disutility for the employee, thus the more 
hours demanded by the job the more likely the worker is to be discontent and to leave, resulting 
in shorter tenure (Killingsworth, 1983). This prediction needs to be tempered, however, by the 
constraints part-time contracts put on the labour supply choices of individuals.  In total, British 
employees on average work 36 hours per week, one in four work part-time, and 28% of 
employees want to work more hours. The proportions of individuals receiving employer provided 
training are substantial at  61%. On average, these workers receive 2.5 days of this training a 
year. Training funded by the employer would be predominantly job specific in nature and is 
typically  associated with longer tenure (Becker, 1975). 
 
Union membership is still substantial in Britain (40%). In terms of the impact of unionism 
on the individual, we would expect that the union would provide a voice mechanism for the 
individual thereby leading to less quits and  longer tenure (Freeman, 1980)
14. The remaining 
                          
14Unions may obviously also provide a range of other services to their members which would increase relative job 
satisfaction and lower the quit rate. One such service which has been found to have a significant positive impact on 
average tenure in the UK, but for which we do not have data, is the provision of a pension scheme (Shah, 1985 and  
Henley et al., 1994).  
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measures of job characteristics are strongly attitudinal: 48%  report that their jobs are stressful; 
5% that their job requires a lot of effort; and 20%  feel insecure about the future of their job.  
 
The expected relationship between education and tenure is non-linear: poorer educated 
individuals may be clustered into low quality, short tenure employment; more highly educated 
individuals face a greater range of employment opportunities and are typically more mobile, both 
resulting in shorter tenure. Some three quarters of the British population did not proceed with 
formal education beyond a maximum of the end of secondary school
15, although 38% have 
obtained an additional vocational qualification. 
 
Occupational choice, at an individual level, is often treated in much the same way as 
educational outcome since they both reflect a range of variables, especially individual ability and 
opportunity (Filer, 1986). Our data sets only cover those currently employed so these 
occupational choices may be also somewhat constrained. We do not have strong priors 
concerning the impact of occupation on tenure. In general, we would expect less skilled 
occupations to be associated with shorter tenure. The occupation dummies will be included 
predominantly as control variables in the regression analysis and they may also help us to 
understand the impact of the variables capturing the work environment. 
 
4.2.  At the workplace level. 
At the workplace level we believe that  the main economic process determining average tenure is 
one of varying labour demand which can be captured by the creative-destructive model of 
Cabellero and Hamour (1984). This model has been applied in a series of job reallocation papers 
(Blanchflower and Burgess, 1996; Mumford and Smith, 1996) and to job reallocation and tenure 
in Australia (Mumford and Smith, 2003). The latter paper develops the model and related 
arguments at length, a further more detailed exposition is available in an appendix from the 
                          





Cabellero and Hamour (1984) argue that the processes of  job creation and destruction are 
profit maximising responses of firms facing continuously advancing technology and exogenous 
changes in the demand for their output. Firms are assumed to introduce new technology by 
creating a new production unit (a new job) which is a bonding of a suitable worker, capital and 
state-of-the-art technology.  New workers are more productive and output will be accordingly 
higher. Once created, the technological level of a job is fixed, consequently a  gap between the 
worker￿s productivity and that of new employees emerges over time.  If firms do not introduce 
new jobs, their production processes will eventually become outdated as the skills of the longer 
tenured members of the labour force become relatively obsolete. When a recession hits, the 
derived demand for the firm￿s employees falls. The firm can reduce the size of its labour force by 
either decreasing  job creation or increasing job destruction. If it adjusts entirely via less creation, 
the incumbent employees are, at least partially, insulated from the recession and average tenure in 
the workplace will rise.  
 
The course chosen by the firm will depend on the nature of the costs involved in creation 
and the necessity to smooth this flow over time. This analysis suggests that average tenure is 
asymmetrically related to expected changes in demand for the output of the workplace; falls in 
demand have a positive impact which is larger than the negative impact of increases in demand 
on tenure (and vice versa for employment growth). Furthermore, tenure will be longer in 
workplaces that are larger, more capital intensive, and running training programs for their 
employees. These relationships will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
The summary statistics for the workplace data are presented in Table 2. Once again the 
data are grouped for descriptive purposes, this time into market (or economic) variables; 
industrial relations indicators; and industry dummies. The data have been weighted by inverse 
sampling probabilities and thus represent the sampling population. Columns 2 to 5 of Table 2 
present summary statistics for the full sample of workplaces (1522), column 6 provides mean  
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values for workplaces with a disproportionately large number of females in the workforce (858 
workplaces) and column 7 similarly provides mean values for workplaces with a 
disproportionately large number of non-whites in the workforce (485 workplaces). This definition 
of disproportionately female or non-white workplaces is where the proportion of these workers in 
a workplace is above the average for all workplaces. These proportions are 49% for females and 
3.5% for non-white workers. 
 
Considering market characteristics
16, at the time of being surveyed Britain had moved out 
of recession and was growing at 1% above its average rate for the period since 1980. This growth 
is reflected in  35% of the workplaces responding that the market for their main product or 
service was growing, with 10% believing it was declining. The figures differ in the non-white 
workplaces where more workplaces recorded market growth (40%) and fewer with a decline 
(6%), although these differences are not significant. The average local area unemployment rate 
was 4.7%. British workplaces often have a formal training program in operation (41%); and 
labour costs are almost half total costs (47%). The majority of workplaces are owned by firms 
who operate multiple workplaces  (65%); and workplaces have 58 employees on average. Female 
workplaces tend to be smaller (51 employees) and non-white workplaces larger (79 employees). 
 
In the Cabellero and Hammour (1994) framework a larger workplace would facilitate 
potential alternative job opportunities for worker￿s whose jobs had become redundant, thereby 
lowering actual changes in the workforce but having little effect on average job tenure. The 
literature on labour market segmentation (Doeringer and Piore, 1971), however, suggests that 
larger workplaces have greater opportunity to develop internal job ladders and establish a system 
of workplace industrial relations (including grievance procedures) that increase job satisfaction 
and lead to lower quits, thereby increasing average tenure (Rebitzer, 1986). Furthermore, in terms 
of both the models, any institutional arrangement which would increase the provision of 
workplace training (such as internal job markets) would lower job destruction and increase 
                          
16The size of the alpha tenure measures (the dependent variables to be used in our final stage of estimation) do not 
have an obvious intuitive interpretation, they are derived from our first stage of estimation and will be discussed 
further below.  
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average job tenure.  
 
The industrial relations measures are also commensurate with the individual data: the  
level of union recognition is 38%.  It is arguable that recognition is a better measure of workplace 
unionism (than, for example, union density) impacting as it does on the union￿s ability to provide 
an aggregate voice in negotiations with management
17. Having a written grievance procedure is 
common  (49%) and 17% of workplaces have a Human Resources Manager. These figures tend 
to be slightly higher in the female or non-white workplaces. 
 
Considering the industry measures, female dominated workplaces are much less likely to 
occur in the manufacturing, construction, electrical and transport sectors, they are more likely to 
occur in the public services and health sectors. The differences in the distribution of non-white 
workplaces is not so obvious, although there is some evidence suggesting they are less likely in 
the electrical sector and more likely in health and other business. 
 
5.  Estimation Results. 
5.1 Individual employee tenure. 
The estimation results for models of individual worker tenure are given in Table 3. Columns 1 
and 3 contain the basic results. These are estimates using OLS for tenure determined only by  the 
individuals characteristics in column 1 and additionally allowing for fixed workplace effects in 
column 3. 
 
In the employee tenure regressions we have identified  distinctions  between demographic 
characteristics, features of the particular job that the worker has, individual human capital and 
occupational outcome. Previous studies (eg Bronars and Famulari, 1997) have only had access to 
demographic information. All these groups of variables can be seen to be important in explaining 
                          
17Since the Trades Dispute Act of 1906, Britain has encouraged a non-legalistic industrial relations environment: 
parties could not claim damages resulting from disputes, agreements were rarely formalised in written contracts, 
there is no sweeping arbitration, and collective agreements have reflected union and management strategy rather than 
the structure of the system itself (Whitfield et al., 1994; Mumford, 1996).  
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job tenure. Education, gender and race are all significant as are occupation, full or part-time 
status, hours worked and a number of job characteristics and related attitudinal variables.  
 
Considering these results in more detail, age is significantly, positively, associated with 
tenure, although the impact declines with age due to the quadratic term
18. Gender and race are 
both significant with females and non-whites having shorter tenure. In the case of females, this is 
some 0.16 years less;  for non-whites the negative impact is larger at 0.63 years. The presence of 
children significantly lowers tenure, except for the presence of infants and for women with 
infants (children aged 4 years and below). As only those currently employed are surveyed these 
results probably reflect a stronger attachment to the labour market amongst those women who 
have chosen to remain working with an infant. Being married increases tenure by 0.2 years. 
 
Job characteristics have an important quantitative and statistical impact on tenure in our 
results. Extending the analysis of Bronars and Famulari (1997), we find that the availability of 
job sharing has a significant and large positive impact on tenure; employer-provided training 
appears to reduce tenure; part-timers clearly have shorter tenure in our results; and overall hours 
worked has little impact except at low numbers of hours in Britain. More stressful jobs are 
associated with longer tenure and, most substantially, current union members have longer tenure, 
to the tune of more than one year. This positive relationship between tenure and membership is 
consistent with the union voice effect predicted by authors such as Freeman (1980)
19. Feelings of 
job insecurity appear to have no significant impact on tenure even when we allow for a 
                          
18As with any analysis of a specific regression model, questions of robustness arise. The first concerns worker age.  
There is a strong relationship in the estimation results between tenure and age (this is commonly found in the 
literature, see Burgess, 1998). The coefficients over-estimate the behavioural impact of age given the obvious direct 
functional relationship between the two.  A strong positive relationship with age remains, suggesting that it is 
behavioural. Also the impact of race and origin are of similar orders of magnitude and significance. 
19As we will see below, analysis of average workplace tenure conditional on the individual characteristics in the 
individual tenure models suggests that the impact of unions is predominantly through individual membership. Our 
results also demonstrate the extent of the missing variable problem in the initial analyses of individual job tenure 
exemplified by the union voice literature. The impacts of gender and race are the most important effects incorrectly 
estimated. Equally, however, the apparent near orthogonality of the remaining variables with the workplace fixed 
effects means that the impact of the remaining individual variables is not altered. In particular, the union membership 
effect is robust which suggests support for the union voice effects on job tenure. A structural estimation of this model 
using linked data is clearly an avenue for future research.  
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differential effect for those working in manual occupations. 
 
Educational attainment has a broadly negative impact on tenure and is most striking at the 
highest levels. This finding supports our belief that more educated workers are more mobile but 
not that the less educated will also have shorter tenure (as has been found in the US, Farber,  
1997). This failure to find shorter tenure amongst lower educated groups is consistent with other 
studies using UK data (Burgess and Rees, 1998; Gregg and Wadsworth, 1998). We also find 
evidence of longer tenure amongst those working in white collar occupations 
 
A number of the effects identified in the OLS results are modified significantly once we 
allow for workplace fixed effects. These results are presented in column 3. Some important 
demographic characteristics have similarly sized coefficients in the two sets of results. The 
impact of age and educational achievement are insignificantly reduced in size. However, the 
impacts of both gender and race on tenure provide an interesting comparison between the OLS 
and fixed effects results. The OLS results indicate a significant negative female gender effect on 
tenure. They also show shorter tenure for those  from a  non-white background. Part-time workers 
also have shorter tenure. These effects are all much reduced in size and significance in the fixed 
effects results. Controlling for the workplace fixed effects shows that analysis of data on 
individuals alone would mistakenly attribute the negative  impact of the type of workplace where 
any member of either of these groups works to their gender or racial background. Similar 
arguments could be made for the impact of some occupational groupings. These results provide 
some support for the idea of segmented labour markets discussed above. 
 
Considering Table 4, which contains further analysis of variance, we distinguish between 
the contributions of individual characteristics on the one hand, and workplace effects, on the 
other. The fixed effects estimation results show that 42.3% of the variation in raw job tenure 
across workers is explained by individual characteristics and workplace effects together. 
Individual characteristics explain 26.9% by themselves and workplace 28.5%. On the margin 
workplace effects explain 15.4% compared with 13.8% for individual characteristics.  
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Comparison with results for the US in Bronars and Famulari (1997) shows a somewhat greater 
relative contribution of worker characteristics in their results. However, they only have a sample 
of 240 establishments which may explain the reduced relative role of establishment fixed effects 
in their results. 
 
According to our results in Table 4, tenure is positively correlated across workers in any 
given workplace, conditional on the individual characteristics of the workers and the jobs they are 
in. Also, conditional differences in tenure across workplaces are quite large. Workplaces with 
average tenure one standard deviation above the overall mean, conditional on individual   
characteristics, have tenure rates 1.6 years longer than the average of 5.36 years. There does not, 
however, appear to be significant evidence that in general long tenure workers sort themselves 
into long tenure workplaces. The simple correlation between workplace average worker and job 
characteristics and workplaces fixed effects is 0.0495. This figure is somewhat lower than that  
found for the US  by Bronars and Famulari of 0.221. The largest correlations between individual 
characteristics and workplace fixed effects are those for gender, racial background, and some 
occupations (as is to be expected from comparison of the OLS and fixed effects regression results 
in Table 3). These results indicate some labour market segmentation. 
 
The workplace fixed effect also includes an unobserved individual effect which is 
common across all employees in the workplace, however, there are remaining idiosyncratic 
unobserved individual characteristics which may bias our estimates (see footnote 6). For 
example, it may be that non-white workers who are first generation migrants from non-English 
speaking countries have a preference to live close to each other in  enclaves (Chiswick and 
Miller, 2002). Once employed, these workers would be less willing to leave resulting in longer 
tenure. Our results would attribute this effect to being non-white and thus bias the coefficient 
estimate in a positive direction. If we could take this into account, the negative effect on tenure 
for non-whites would be even greater and workplace segregation would be more important. 
 
In fact, however, the workplace fixed effects we find to be important in determining  
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individual tenure are essentially uncorrelated with observed individual characteristics. It seems 
unlikely therefore that these workplace effects mostly capture unobserved individual 
characteristics as, according to the results in Table 4, these omitted individual features would 
themselves be almost entirely uncorrelated with the wide range of individual and job 
characteristics that we employ in our individual analysis
20. We can, however, obtain some insight 
into which workplace characteristics are correlated with the fixed effects by analysing the 
workplace data. We turn to that in the next section. 
 
5.2 Workplace tenure. 
In this section we consider models of the workplace fixed-effects, that is average tenure in the 
workplace conditioning on the individual characteristics of the workers concerned. The estimates 
are given in Table 5. We present three sets of estimates. First, estimates for all 1522 workplaces 
(in column  1) and then, second, for the 858 workplaces with disproportionately female (column 
3) and finally, the 485 disproportionately non-white workforces (column 5). In the final two 
cases, this definition of disproportionately female or non-white workplaces is where the 
proportion of these workers in a workplace is above the average for all workplaces. These 
proportions are 49% for females and  3.5% for non-white workers. Comparison of the estimates 
for these three samples gives us an insight into the worker tenure results above
21. 
 
First, we consider estimates for the full sample (column 1). Output demand effects have a 
significant impact on workplace average tenure. The impact of positive demand changes is to 
reduce average tenure whilst negative demand changes increase tenure. As the model evaluated 
by Mumford and Smith (2002) shows; positive demand shocks will result in reduced average 
                          
20It may be that women and non-white employees behave as a group (even once we have allowed for their individual 
characteristics) in such a way as to produce shorter tenure in their workplaces than white males do, however, we 
don￿t believe our results provide any evidence for this claim. Indeed, our results go further than the large literature of 
previous cross sectional studies by linking evidence for both employee characteristics and identifying the workplace 
effect. 
21The dependent variable in Table 5 is the workplace fixed effect which is generated. As this variable is the 
dependent variable, therefore, there is no generated regressor problem in assessing the estimated parameters of the 
models reported in this table. If it were a right hand side variable then adjustments analogous to those proposed by 
Pagan (1984) would indeed need to be employed.  
 
19
tenure if workplaces predominantly choose to adjust the level of labour demand upwards by 
increasing hiring rather than reducing firing. Reduced demand appears to increase tenure, again 
suggesting that firms adjust hiring downwards rather than increase firing.  
 
General local labour market conditions are also an important determinant of conditional 
workplace tenure in our results. The unemployment rate in the standard statistical region of the 
workplace increases tenure. The impact of increased unemployment on reducing quits makes this 
the expected sign. We might also expect the local unemployment rate to be an additional measure 
of local product market demand conditions. Given our discussion of the impact of workplace 
demand above, the positive effect of unemployment on tenure is reinforcing.  
 
Two features of workplace structure are significant in the full-sample results: workplace 
age and multiple workplaces. Workplace age might be expected to be positively associated with 
average tenure by construction. However, we find (in unreported results) this effect remains 
significant if we restrict analysis to very long -lived workplaces. Institutional features such as 
well-developed industrial relations procedures in older firms can be expected to be important 
here. This is further supported by the significant positive impact of the existence of grievance 
procedures. Workplaces which are part of firms with multiple workplaces have shorter average 
tenure in our results which may be due to the added flexibility multiple workplaces brings to the 
firm when allocating workers to jobs. 
 
Finally, in common with Bronars and Famulari (1997), we find that conditional 
workplace average tenure is significantly affected by the industry in which the workplace 
operates. From Table 5 it can be seen that there are some differences between sectors
22, several 
industries have significantly lower tenure than the missing wholesale and retail sector category. 
Workplaces in the electrical and health sectors have the lowest average tenure, whilst none are 
                          
22F-tests for the exclusion of industry effects are significant at the 1% level.  
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significantly higher than the wholesale and retail sector.  
 
Comparing the results for all workplaces (column 1) with those for disproportionately 
female (column 3) and disproportionately non-white (column 5) workplaces, we can see that 
these workplaces are reacting differently to some of the economic measures. In the general 
results, improved market demand leads to lower tenure suggesting firms respond by creating 
more jobs. This is not true for female and non-white workplaces. Similarly tenure in the female 
and non-white workplaces is more strongly related to the unemployment rate suggesting members 
of these workforces are less likely to quit given the unemployment rate. And the declining 
negative impact of multiple workplaces suggests workers are less likely to be relocated within the 
firm if they are in female or non-white dominated workplaces. Taken together these results 
suggest that the average tenure of workforces in female and non-white workplaces is less 
responsive to measures of market change. 
 
The impact of the industrial relations indicators is similar across the three types of 
workplaces. Comparing industry effects in the general results with the non-white workplaces 
shows a similar pattern across these workplaces, however,  in those industries associated with a 
lower average tenure the negative relationship is often stronger for non-white workplaces (the 
electrical, hotels, and transport sectors). The negative impact associated with the health sector is 
much the same, whilst non-white workplaces in the public service sector have smaller decline in 
tenure. Typically this pattern of industry effects is not reproduced for female workplaces.  
 
The one industry where the direction of the impact on average tenure is significantly 
reversed in across our workplace categories is manufacturing, in general this sector is associated 
with lower average tenure. However, female dominated workplaces in manufacturing have higher 
average tenure and this effect is stronger in non-white workplaces. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper examines the determination of individual and workplace tenure employing new linked  
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data sets which has allowed for a more complete analysis of the determinants of job tenure. Using 
a fixed effects estimator, we find that a range of demographic, job related, educational, and 
occupation variables are important for explaining individual job tenure. We also find strong 
evidence of a positive impact of union membership on individual job tenure. This is consistent 
with the union voice literature, although our approach is different to those studies. 
 
Workplace fixed effects explain as much of the variation in individual tenure as the 
measured individual characteristics in our study. These two groups of variables are essentially 
uncorrelated implying that the measured individual characteristics of long tenure workers are not 
closely related with the features of long tenure workplaces. However, we do find the negative 
impact of gender and race on tenure, that is well documented in the existing literature and 
appears strongly significant in estimates excluding workplace effects, is offset when workplace 
effects are included. We interpret this as evidence in favour of job segmentation. 
 
We find, when exploring workplace average tenure conditioning on the individual 
characteristics of the workers, that tenure is longer in workplaces facing reduced market demand 
and higher local area unemployment indicative of mobile workforces. Workplaces with 
disproportionately female and non-white workforces are, however, less responsive to these 
measures of market change. Furthermore, of those industries with low average tenure, tenure is 
even lower in  non-white workplaces. Future work, possibly including linked panel data,  could 
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Table 1.  Summary statistics for the employee data. 
Variable Mean Std.  Error Min Max     Definition 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)        (6)   
   
tenure  5.357  0.059  0.5  10  years at workplace (mid points 5 bands) max 10 years 
 
age  39.014  0.153  20  60  midpoints of  individuals age bands (7 bands) 
female 0.478  0.009  0.00  1.00  female 
child04 0.146  0.005  0.00  1.00  dep child aged 0-4 
child511 0.201  0.005  0.00  1.00  dep child aged 5-11 
child12 0.201  0.004  0.00  1.00  dep child aged12-18 
non-white 0.035  0.002  0.00  1.00  not  white
married 0.697  0.005  0.00  1.00  cohabiting with spouse or partner
 
home working  0.098  0.005  0.00  1.00  working from home is available 
job share  0.163  0.005  0.00  1.00  job sharing is available
flexible time 0.324  0.008  0.00  1.00  flexible working hours are available
part time  0.246  0.008  0.00  1.00  work < 30 hours per week
total hours  36.239  0.239  0.5  125  total hours worked in norm week, incl overtime 
prefer more hours 0.279  0.006  0.00  1.00  work extra hours because enjoy or need money
training  2.538  0.044  0.00  10  days of employer paid for or organised job training in previous year 
training dummy 0.61 0.04  0.00  1.00  employer paid for or organised job training
union member  0.397  0.011  0.00  1.00  is a union (or staff association) member
job stress  0.482  0.006  0.00  1.00  worry a lot about job outside working hours
job effort 0.048  0.002  0.00  1.00  job requires respondent to work very hard
job insecurity 0.195 0.005 0.00  1.00  feel  job is insecure at this wp
 
CSE  0.118  0.003  0.00  1.00  CSE or equiv, GCSE (grades D-G), highest education ...
O-level  0.271  0.005  0.00  1.00  O level or equiv, GCSE (grades A-C)
A-level  0.156  0.004  0.00  1.00  A level or equiv 
degree 0.164  0.005  0.00  1.00  degree or equiv 
post grad 0.056  0.003  0.00  1.00  post grad degree or equiv
other educ  0.233  0.006  0.00  1.00  have other educ qual  
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Table 1.  Summary statistics for the employee data. 
Variable Mean Std.  Error Min Max     Definition 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)        (6)   





operative 0.093  0.003  0.00  1.00  operative and assembly
sales 0.134  0.004  0.00  1.00  sales  operator, sales assistant
personal 0.095  0.004  0.00  1.00  personal and protective services
craft  0.163  0.005  0.00  1.00  craft and skilled service 
clerk  0.104  0.005  0.00  1.00  clerical and secretarial
assoc prof  0.079  0.006  0.00  1.00  associate professional and technical 
profs 0.098  0.006  0.00  1.00  professionals
managers  0.124  0.008  0.00  1.00  managers and senior administrators 
other occup 0.110  0.005  0.00  1.00  other  occupational group
 
no. of observations 22173
no. of strata  70 data are weighted to allow for stratification and clustering  
no. of PSU  1774 in the surveying process
   
   
    
   
Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey: Cross-Section, 1998 (computer file). 4
th ed. Colchester: The Data Archive (distributor),  
             22 December 1999. SN: 3955.  
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Table 2.  Summary statistics for the workplace data.    
 
all workplaces  female nonwhite  
Variable Mean S.Dev. Min Max Mean   Mean Definition 
     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)      (8) 
   
(alpha) tenure  -0.318  1.79  -4.66  5.12 -0.504  -0.637 from the fixed effect tenure regression 
average  tenure 4.730 2.07 0.50  10.00 4.509  4.359 average current job tenure in the workplace (5 bands)
   
increasing demand  0.350  0.48  0.00  1.00 0.357  0.397 market for workplace main product or service growing 
decreasing demand  0.104  0.31  0.00  1.00 0.100  0.055 market for workplace main product or service declining 
local unemployment rate  4.724  1.16  3.10  7.34 4.780  4.824 unemployment rate by standard statistical region 
training  0.411  0.39  0.00  1.00 0.450  0.456 fraction with formal off the job training (7 bands) 
labour cost  0.468  0.28  0.13  0.88 0.501  0.468 labour costs as proportion of total costs (4bands) 
multi wp  0.651 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.700  0.718 wp is one of multiple wps in enterprise
wp size  58.076  218.35  10.00  14139 51.207  79.078 employees on payroll 12 months previously 
wpage 30.432  42.92  0.00  473 31.924  31.089 age of the workplace
   
union recognised  0.377  0.48  0.00  1.00 0.434  0.412 union recognised in negotiation 
grievance  procedure  0.487 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.543  0.536 collective  grievance  procedure 
HR rep.  0.168  0.37  0.00  1.00 0.168  0.205 presence of human resources manager 
   
manufacturing  0.139 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.064  0.120 manufacturing 
construction  0.002 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.000  0.001 construction 
electrical  0.041 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.001  0.017 electrical 
wholesale  0.200 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.188  0.186 wholesale 
hotels  0.073 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.094  0.084 hotels 
transport  0.039 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.018  0.047 transport 
finance  0.027 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.031  0.026 finance 
other  business  0.106 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.106  0.141 other  business 
education  0.043 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.036  0.033 education  
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Table 2.  Summary statistics for the workplace data.    
 
all workplaces  female nonwhite  
Variable Mean S.Dev. Min Max Mean   Mean Definition 
     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)      (8) 
public  0.128 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.191  0.138 public  services 
health  0.149 0.36 0.00 1.00 0.225  0.173 health 
other  0.053 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.044  0.034 other 
   
no. of observations  1522  858  485  data weighted by inverse sampling probabilities. 
            
Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey: Cross-Section, 1998 (computer file). 4
th ed. Colchester: The Data Archive (distributor), 22 December 1999. SN: 3955.  
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Table 3.  Employee tenure.    
tenure   OLS    Fixed  Effect   
 Coef. t-value  Coef. t-value 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
age 0.266  13.89  ** 0.252  13.35  ** 
age
2 (X100) -2.062  -8.53  ** -1.957  -8.33  ** 
female -0.160  -1.99  ** 0.057  0.73 
child04 -0.021  -0.20  -0.043  -0.38   
child512 -0.191  -2.33  ** -0.163  -1.97  ** 
child13 -0.303  -3.62  ** -0.301  -3.69  ** 
female*child04 0.393  2.41  ** 0.434  2.63  ** 
non-white -0.634  -4.07  ** -0.407  -2.19  ** 
married 0.243  3.41** 0.171  2.32  ** 
  
home working  -0.064  -0.54   0.035  0.32  
job share  0.228  2.63 ** 0.283  3.24 ** 
flexible time  -0.013  -0.17  -0.021  -0.29  
part time  -0.522  -3.40 ** -0.351  -2.31 ** 
total hours     0.021  1.41  0.015  1.20   
total hours2(x100) -0.029  -1.74  * -0.009  -0.60     
prefer more hours  0.061  0.82  -0.061  -0.81  
training -0.070  -6.28  ** -0.074  -6.61  ** 
union member 1.520  18.43  ** 1.238  14.49  ** 
job stress  0.444  6.64 ** 0.486  7.33 ** 
job effort -0.111  -0.78  -0.114  -0.85   
insecure -0.075  -0.78  -0.078  -0.80   
insecure*manual 0.100  0.63  0.042  0.25   
   
other education 0.038  0.29  -0.033  -0.24   
olevel -0.235  -1.97  ** -0.253  -2.29  ** 
alevel -0.324  -2.49  ** -0.369  -2.86  ** 
degree -1.004  -6.60  ** -0.966  -6.44  ** 
postgrad -1.661  -9.08  ** -1.567  -8.55  ** 
vocational qual.  -0.135  -2.10 **  -0.102  -1.58  
  
sales 0.607  3.38  ** 0.635  3.43  ** 
personal services  0.688  3.95 ** 0.664  3.63 ** 
skilled/crafts 0.726  4.34  **  0.511  2.78  ** 
clerk 0.337  2.13  ** 0.309  1.86  * 
assoc professional  0.734  3.98 **  0.481  2.59 ** 
professional -0.244  -1.31  0.070  0.36   
manager 0.252  1.31  -0.138  -0.67   
other occupation -0.296  -1.95  * -0.189  -1.14   
constant -2.378  -5.46  ** -2.006  -4.41  ** 
    
Number of obs      22173   22173  
    F( 36, 22136)  170.79 **  F( 36, 20363) 73.66 ** 
R-squared        0.27  0.42 
Adj R-squared   0.37 
Number strata    70  70 
Number PSU         1774  1774 
Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey: Cross-Section, 1998 (computer file). 4
th ed. Colchester: The 
Data Archive (distributor), 22 December 1999. SN: 3955. Data are weighted to allow for stratification and 
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Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey: Cross-Section, 1998 (computer file). 4
th ed. Colchester: The 
Data Archive (distributor), 22 December 1999. SN: 3955. Data are weighted to allow for stratification and 








Table 5. Workplace tenure   
               
    all workplaces      disp. female      disp. non-white    
   Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value  
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   
              
                
increasing market  -0.402  -4.02 **    -0.137  -1.12     0.190 1.44    
decreasing market  0.817  5.29 **    0.662  3.35 **    0.901 3.31 ** 
local unemployment rate  0.087  2.24 **    0.113  2.32 **    0.174 2.86 ** 
training  0.088  0.68     -0.260  -1.63     0.433 2.56 ** 
labour  cost  -0.060  -0.28   0.240  0.92     0.389 1.37     
multiple workplaces  -0.564  -5.21 **    -0.378  -2.62 **    -0.041 -0.27  
workplace size (X1000)  0.230  1.10       0.229  0.75       0.089 0.53  
workplace age (X100)    0.225  2.05 **    0.103  0.85     -0.501 -4.20 ** 
           
         
union recognition  -0.031  -0.26     -0.216  -1.52     0.146 0.86  
grievance procedure  0.318  3.12 **    0.458  3.79 **    0.340 2.54 ** 
HR rep.   0.131  1.03  0.232  1.50  0.145 0.95 
           
manufacturing    -0.378  -2.36  **   0.671  2.48 **    1.204 4.91 ** 
construction    0.580  0.57     -0.357  -0.15     -0.453 -0.28  
electrical    -0.989  -4.04 **    -0.099  -0.06     -1.345 -2.89 ** 
hotels    -0.563  -2.89 **    -0.102  -0.46     -0.786 -3.20 ** 
transport    -0.336  -1.35     0.025  0.06     -0.293 -0.96  
finance    -0.490  -1.68 *    0.330  0.98     -0.579 -1.52  
other business    -0.684  -3.86 **    -0.290  -1.27     -0.620 -2.78 ** 
education    -0.093  -0.34     0.247  0.70     -0.211 -0.56  
public    -0.736  -3.61 **    -0.158  -0.68     -0.566 -2.07 ** 
health    -1.003  -5.72 **    -0.484  -2.37 **    -0.298 -1.34    
other    -0.009  -0.04     0.841  2.82 **    0.001 0.00  
constant    -0.080  -0.34 *    -0.956  -3.06 **    -1.877 -5.02 ** 
    
No. of obs    1522   858    485  
F test  F(22,1499)  7.5 **  F(22, 835) 4.8 **    F(22, 462)  8.19 ** 
R-squared        0.0992 0.1123    0.2806 
Adj R
2  0.086 0.089    0.2463 
    
Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey: Cross-Section, 1998 (computer file). 4
th ed. Colchester: The 
Data Archive (distributor), 22 December 1999. SN: 3955. Data are weighted to allow for stratification in the 
surveying process. *significant at 90% and **significant at 95% confidence levels. 
 
 
 